Ireland and UNIFIL by 石塚 勝美
─ 35─
Abstract
This paper will focus on the performance of the Irish Defence Forces in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). The current situation in South Lebanon where the Irish contingent has been deployed is relatively calm. 
However, the authors’ field research in UNIFIL in August 2019 convinced that there is an anti-UNIFIL sentiment 
among the local people in the Hezbollah-based town where the Irish peacekeepers are patrolling. Meanwhile, the 
Israelis have been traditionally provocative to UNIFIL. There have been four major military operations between Israel 
and Lebanon, where the UN troops were totally bypassed. Therefore, one cannot be optimistic of the performance of 
UNIFIL. Meanwhile, the Irish personnel has been motivated to participate in UNIFIL for various reasons. Most of 
them are based on the institutional and normative rationales. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the factors of motivation 
among the Irish largely depend on their age and military rank.
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1.  Introduction
Historically, there has been a wide range of literature of the studies of UN peacekeeping operations. This 
paper focuses the peacekeeping studies on the dispatching side, contributing states. The Republic of Ireland 
has been a consistently positive contributing state to UN peacekeeping operations. This paper will deal with 
Ireland’s response to UN peacekeeping operations, especially, in UNIFIL in South Lebanon. On the one hand, 
UN peacekeeping operations have been required to push for a more robust response to the perceived threat 
from armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. In 2017, 61 peacekeepers were killed as a result of hostile 
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related forces and Irish soldiers in UNIFIL. One the other hand, Ireland has had a strong commitment in 
UNIFIL. This paper will discuss about the motivation of Ireland and its military personnel in UNIFIL, based on 
the authors’ fi eld research in UNIFIL in August 2019. 
This paper consists of three parts. The fi rst part of the paper will deal with the historical analysis of the 
theory of contributing states’ policy towards UN peacekeeping operations. This paper, which mentions some 
theorists of UN peacekeeping, indicates that the theory has been evolving. The second and the third parts of 
the paper will be based on the author’s fi eld research. The second part will concern the current situation in the 
Irish area of operations. The third part will deal with general and individual motivation of Irish contingents for 
UNIFIL.
This paper is still a tentative part of the author’s whole research project on the policy of contributing states 
to UN peacekeeping operations.
  
2.  The theory of states’ motivation for participating in UN peacekeeping operations 
The theory of the motivation studies of contributing states to UN peacekeeping operations has been 
evolving. The early periods of the studies focused this discussion on the pro-realist and pro-idealist perspectives. 
In terms of the pro-realist perspectives, for example, in 1990, Alan James, a well-known political realist, argued 
that, in peacekeeping operations, the question of which states should be invited to contribute to an operation, or 
whose offers should be invited, is often intensely political.1 
In 1995, Laura Neack also strongly supported the realist account of a state’s participation in peacekeeping 
operations. Her main theory was that the particular interests that have been served by UN peacekeeping were 
those of the western middle-power states whose interests were served by the status quo. She pointed out that 
such middle power states such as Sweden, Italy, Brazil and the Netherlands were among top 13 major weapons’ 
exporters to the developing world, which had frequently required and accepted international peacekeeping 
operations at the same time. Thus, she saw arms sales and peacekeeping operations at the same time: the 
pursuit of national interests.2
In 1997, David Bobrow and Mark Boyer also considered peacekeeping operations as “impure public goods” 
that have continued to be provided by the self-interests of contributing states, associated with maintaining some 
modicum of international system stability. They insisted that UN peacekeeping operations were “club goods”; 
some highly supportive participants remained members of the UN PKO relevant club for reason in pertaining 
to their status within the UN.3  
Meanwhile, as a supporter of the pro-liberalist perspectives, in 2000, Andreas Andersson said that in 
regard to state participation in peacekeeping operations, there is a viable alternative to explanations based on 
Realpolitik. He emphasized that the purpose of peacekeeping was not only to end confl ict but also to prevent its 
recurrence by promoting democracy. He mentioned that among the substantial contributors to peace support 
operations, well-consolidated democracies show the greatest propensity to participate. He indicated that 
participation in peacekeeping expressed self-interest, which is shaped by Idealpolitik instead of Realpolitik.4 
Likewise, in 1995, Terry Terrif and James Keeley raised the theory that the involvement of many states 
in internal confl icts had generally been of little global importance during the post-Cold War era. They raised a 
simple question as to why so many states had been willing to be involved in the confl icts of peripheral areas, 
such as Africa and the former Soviet Union, by sending peacekeeping troops with less political motivations. 
This phenomenon could not fully be explained from a Realpolitik perspective.5
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Furthermore, in 1996, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, who also had the idealist perspective, conducted a case 
study of the motivations underlying Chapter VII-led peace operations, in particular, operations in Kuwait 
(1991), Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994) and Haiti (1994). In conclusion, he pointed out 
that only in the case of Kuwait were national interests the significant factor in the explanation of providing 
peace enforcement.6 In other words, as David Wainhouse puts it, “Participation in a peacekeeping operation 
is a voluntary act and if a state has no special interest in a situation it will usually have a fairly high degree of 
general interest.”7
After the debate of the pro-idealist and pro-realist perspectives, in the 2000s, the more state-specific 
approach emerged. In other words, each troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations began to define 
its interests differently in the post-Cold War periods. In 2000, as general foreign policies in international 
considerations of UN peacekeeping contribution, Katsumi Ishizuka focused on the peacekeeping policy of 
the US as a case of a great power, that of Canada as a middle power, and Fiji as a small power. He concluded 
that there is a tendency for bigger states to value their commitment to peacekeeping with greater respect to 
international stability, and the small states with greater respect to domestic interests. He continued that the 
greater powers, the more selective and fl exible peacekeeping policy they enjoy. He also stated that the greater 
powers’ motivations for peacekeeping contribution has been affected by the change in the international political 
climates (such as the termination of the Cold War) than the smaller ones.8
Meanwhile, as specifi c foreign policies of international considerations of UN peacekeeping contribution, 
Ishizuka raised several factors, such as: commonality with host states; concern about national security; big 
powers’ intervention in their backyards; a desire for the permanent membership of UN Security Council; 
supporting Secretary-Generals from own countries; and rivalry with neighbours. Furthermore, as domestic 
considerations, he raised political, fi nancial and military factors.9
In the 2010s, the International Peace Institute in the US established the research section “Providing 
Peacekeepers”. In the Institute, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams conducted the survey on the policies of major 
contributing states to UN peacekeeping and concluded to lead the fi ve major rationales of dispatching personnel 
to UN peacekeeping by states, which are as follows:
Political rationales: more voice in international security issues; pressure or persuasion by allies, great powers, 
or the UN; enhancing the states’ national prestige
Economic rationales: the compensation payments for troop contributing states; individual allowances; UN 
procurement contract
Security rationales: threat mitigation of particular confl icts; broader national and international security interests
Institutional rationales: the country’s armed forces, security sectors and bureaucratic dynamics; invaluable 
overseas experience for soldiers and offi cers; rehabilitation effect 
Normative rationales: global good Samaritans; good international citizenship; an alternative to great power 
hegemony.10   
3.  A Current Situation of the Irish area of operations in UNIFIL
According to the field research by the author in August 2019, there are in total 435 Irish soldiers and 
officers, which is the seventh largest troop of all 44 troop contributing states in UNIFIL. The Headquarters 
of the Irish Unit, or the 114th Irish Batt, is located on the border with Israel, in Sector West of UNIFIL. The 
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deployment of the Irish Unit in the unstable border with Israel indicates the trust the UN has in the Irish due to 
their achievements and signifi cant records as the UN peacekeepers. 
In fact, the Israel and Lebanese sides are provocative to each other. In accordance with Secretary General’s 
report in July 2019, UNIFIL verified the five tunnels near the Israeli town of Zar’it, south of the Blue Line, 
across from Ramiyah, Sector West. These fi ve tunnels were discovered by the Israel Defense Forces.11 It was 
perceived among UN personnel that they were dug by the Lebanese side12, three of which crossed the Blue 
Line. It was in violation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Meanwhile, UNIFIL has called the Israel 
Defense Forces to suspend its illegal construction works in the Lebanese “reservation” area until an agreement 
had been reached between the parties, the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, 
the works continued.13 Furthermore, Israel has continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of Resolution 
1701 (2006). From February to June 2019, UNIFIL recorded an average of 100 airspace violations each month. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for 72 percent of the violations, and the other violations involved fi ghter 
aircraft or unidentifi ed aircraft.14
From 18 February to 24 June, UNIFIL reported 333 ground violations of the Blue Line, 329 of which 
had been committed by unarmed civilians crossing south of the Blue Line.15 In the Irish area of operations, 
the Irish Unit set up several UN Positions, where about 30 strong Irish platoons have been deployed for the 
observation and patrolling tasks. According to the observation records kept by some UN Position, there are, 
on average, one or two daily cases of civilians approaching or stepping inside the Blue Line which is a border 
demarcation between Israel and Lebanon.16 Among the civilians approaching the Blue Line with binoculars are 
Hezbollah-related persons or even Hezbollah soldiers themselves pretending to be normal Lebanese citizens. 
They have been motivated to come to the Blue Line for obtaining information of the Israeli side, by which 
they can get rewarding money.17 One Irish officer said that there used to be a very tense situation between 
the Israel Defense Forces and several Lebanese people simply when the latter stepped in the Blue Line with a 
huge 4 Wheel Drive vehicle.18 On the Israeli side, their observation posts or towers are also standing at regular 
intervals.
In fact, among 14 villages where the Irish soldiers are in charge of patrolling is one major Hezbollah-
based town, called Bint Jubayl. Bint Jubayl has been strategically important as a stronghold for Hezbollah, and 
therefore the town had been raided seriously by the Israel Defense Forces in 2006. Hezbollah, which is a Shia 
Islamist political party19 and militant group based in Lebanon, has, reportedly, received fi nancial aid of $1 billion 
annually from Iran as the cost of war against Israel. Therefore, there are a significant number of Hezbollah 
soldiers living in Bint Jubayl. However, the situation in South Lebanon has been relatively calm, especially, since 
2006 when the war between Israel and Hezbollah broke out and the following “new” UNIFIL or UNIFIL II has 
been deployed. As a result, since there has been less cases and frequency of confl icts and wars against Israel20, 
the income paid to Hezbollah soldiers has been decreased from $700 to $300 per month. Many Hezbollah 
soldiers attributed the decreasing amount of their income to the existence and deployment of UNIFIL near the 
border with Israel in South Lebanon. The lower income of Hezbollah militants has brought about the entirely 
economic decline in the town of Bint Jubayl. Consequently, the atmosphere of “anti-UNIFIL” has been created 
among the locals in the town. Likewise, the local people have been paid by Hezbollah for raising a large poster 
of Hezbollah with the photo of ex-Hezbollah soldiers sacrifi cing their lives in the confl ict against Israel. They 
have also been paid for providing some information about the Israel Defense Forces. Such locals have been 
enforced by Hezbollah to say “I don’t like Israel” and “I don’t like UNIFIL” publicly.21 Hezbollah and the local 
supporters frequently say “We are forced to have UNIFIL.” 
In fact, apart from Bint Jubyal, there are other several conservative villages and towns in the Irish area 
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of operations. They take a cautious stance on the UN troops, in general. Some of them believe that UNFIL 
is pro-Israel, and that UNIFIL is sharing information with Israel. Therefore, they do not accept that not only 
UNIFIL personnel but also general foreigners take photos in their villages. In fact, one Irish offi cer claimed 
that the effectiveness of CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination) depends on villages.22 Thus, such “anti-UNIFIL” 
perception requires the Irish battalion to conduct more cautious patrolling in the areas of Hezbollah-based or 
conservative towns.
The above case illustrates that the Irish contingent and presumably UNIFIL on the whole can’t always 
enjoy local consent from the Lebanese side. Meanwhile, Israel has kept psychological distance from UNIFIL 
since its establishment in 1978. In fact, the dissatisfaction and bitterness have been typical of Israel’s attitude 
towards UNIFIL. When UNIFIL II was created in 2006 in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701, 
Timur Goksel, former spokesman for the UNIFIL, said that part of the great Israeli disappointment is a result 
of the expectations that UNIFIL, rather than being a peacekeeping force, would be a “combat force or an 
anti-terror force.”23 In fact, since the deployment of UNIFIL in 1978, Israel has conducted the major military 
operations against the Lebanese side in 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee), 1993 (Operation Accountability), 
1996 (Operation Grape of Wrath)24 and 2006 following the Resolution 1701 and the establishment of UNFILII. 
The above four Israeli military operations indicated that the Israeli Defense Forces bypassed UN troops when 
it adopted the decisive option against the Lebanese side.25 At each Israeli military operation against Lebanon 
or Hezbollah, the UN troops in UNIFIL, who were lightly-armed, has been faced with extremely dangerous 
circumstance. UNIFIL has been a UN operation as peacekeeping, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter. It is 
generally perceived that Chapter VI-based peacekeeping operations are in more stable and less risky situation 
than Chapter VII-led so-called “peace enforcement” which are currently deployed in many internal confl icts in 
Africa. However, in South Lebanon, one can identify the intermittent risks of the recurrence of a major state 
of war between the state of Israel and Hezbollah in the future. It would be non-predictable and non-preventive 
for UN peacekeepers. Meanwhile, Chapter VII-led operations tend to be established in confl icting situations 
among armed groups and militias in internal confl icts even if the scale of confl icts is not as signifi cant as intra-
state confl icts such as those in the Middle East. In other words, the UN establishes Chapter VII-led operations 
to the predictable or already existent confl icts which continuously occur and therefore directly risk the lives 
of local people from the imminent threats from immoral warlords, militias or terrorist groups. Such peace 
enforcement includes not only relatively dangerous UN operations in Africa such as MONUSCO but also those 
in Timor-Leste in 2000s, namely, UNTAET, which has relatively low records of UN casualties. The UN tends 
to provide Chapter VI-led operations when the conflict is currently non-existent and future belligerency is 
unpredictable even if the potential risk and damage of the warfare is signifi cant, like the case of UNIFIL which 
has high records of casualties. Therefore, the author’s fi eld research convinced that the theory “Chapter VII-led 
operations are more dangerous than Chapter VI-led operations” are not always applicable. Rather, the difference 
between Chapter VII- and Chapter VI-led operations is the matter of predictability and frequency of the confl icts 
and actual existence of confl icts at the moment, not the magnitude, seriousness, and potential of casualties in 
the confl icts. In this sense, although UNIFIL is a Chapter VI-led peacekeeping operation, the peacekeepers in 
UNIFIL including the Irish contingent cannot be optimistic about their mission in South Lebanon.    
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4.  The Irish motivation for participating in UNIFIL
4-1.  General motivation: its defensive, humanitarian and acceptable posture
First of all, it is to be noted that Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Anna Bulakh, wrote an article 
“Soldiers of Peace: Estonia, Finland and Ireland in UNIFIL”, in the Report of International Centre for Defence 
and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, in 2016. This article referred to the motivations of three small European states 
contributing states. It argues that traditionally, small states, including Estonia, Finland and Ireland, have 
pursued policies aimed at preserving their survival, including those – such as participating in UN peacekeeping 
– that strengthen international law.26 Specifi cally, in terms of their motivations to join UN peacekeeping, the 
article compared to one another as follows:
Irish decision-makers tend to see peacekeeping above all as an essential component of a values-based foreign 
policy, while Estonian decision makers look for more tangible returns for their participation including, 
ultimately, an expectation that their readiness to provide security will ensure that they themselves are not left 
alone in times of crisis. Finnish decision makers also explain their contribution largely in terms of values, 
but, much more than Ireland, also justify it on the grounds of building the capability of the Finnish Defence 
Forces.27
Ireland has strong “emotional” ties to the UN as “the cradle of its independence and an equally strong political 
and military commitment to UN peacekeeping.”28 The valued-based approach and liberal motivation for UN 
peacekeeping operations has been repeated at the author’s interview with the offi cials of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Irish Government in February 2019. In accordance with the interview, the 
Irish offi cials of Foreign Affairs regarded the history of Irish contribution of UN peacekeeping operations as the 
simple but signifi cant transference of “DNA” which the Irish Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) have had. They 
consider that international peace is important especially for small states such as Ireland, and therefore that 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations for Ireland is a signifi cant international contribution. They simply 
said “Historically speaking, peacekeeping is fundamentally good. There should be no shift in the state’s policy 
towards UN peacekeeping operations.”29 Meanwhile, John F. Quinn argues that it is necessary to analyse the 
theoretical basis for such a value-based ethical position for Irish peacekeeping operations. Quinn quoted Article 
29 of Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland) in this context:
1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the idea of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on 
international justice and morality. 
2. Ireland affi rms its adherence to the principle of pacifi c settlement of international disputes by international 
arbitration or judicial determination.
3. Ireland accepts the generally recognized principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations 
with other states30    
Quinn argues that considering the absence of an assertion of the right to use force of arms in pursuing 
its interests, this is a remarkable statement for a sovereign country to make and in many ways is a prophetic 
declaration of the UN Charter’s prohibition of international conflict and acts of aggression.31 Irish Colonel 
Byern, Deputy Commanding Offi cer, Sector West of UNIFIL, mentioned a signifi cant implication on this matter. 
He claimed that the absence of an assertion of the right to use force of arms and its defensive posture rather 
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than offensive in the Irish military can be recognized by its offi cial name, “the Irish Defence Forces”, not “the 
Irish Armed Forces”.32  
In a similar context, it is significant to pay attention to Chiara Ruffa’s article “Military Cultures and 
Force Employment in Peace Operations.” This article compares between the French and Italian troops in the 
military cultures and its refl ection in their policy and attitude towards the peace operations in UNIFIL in South 
Lebanon and ISAF in Afghanistan. French military culture is very cautious and consistently emphasizes an 
assertive fi ghting spirit. Meanwhile, Italian military culture is more humane. They came to consider themselves 
ineffective but good soldiers. As a consequence, in UNIFIL, the French troops prioritized operational activities, 
such as extensive patrolling or training of the local armed forces, and displayed high force-protection levels. The 
Italian troops focused on humanitarian activities, such as implementing development projects and distributing 
toys to children, displayed low levels of force protection, and did much less patrolling than the French.33 When 
the author mentioned Ruffa’s article when he had an interview with an Irish offi cer, the offi cer clearly said that 
Ireland is defi nitely close to the Italian type rather than the French. While the French perceived UNIFIL as an 
ordinary military operation with a high threat level that calls for military skills, the Irish as well as Italian regard 
the UN mission as genuine peacekeeping and their required skills are constructed around cultural awareness 
with the belief of being good humanitarian soldiers.34 
In fact, UNIFIL’s offi cial press admits that the mission attaches great importance to relation with its local 
population in the area of operations. For example, the soldiers in UNIFIL participate in community events 
and conduct training programmes for the people in the fi elds such as computers, languages, yoga etc.35 Nitza 
Nachmias stated that UNIFIL’s humanitarian activities have helped to change even the concept of peacekeeping 
while highlighting the complex link between peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.36
The Irish contingent has also valued a humanitarian aspect in their mission in UNIFIL. Despite the 
constraint of their location between the IDF and SLA/DFF to the Islam Resistance emerging from the north, 
Irish battalions did not stop offering humanitarian aid to the local people. McDonald cites the example of 
the 64th battalion, which suffered the biggest number of casualties in Lebanon but provided various forms of 
humanitarian assistance: donating $1,700 to buy diesel oil for the Tibnin hospital; setting up medical clinics 
in Ayta Az-Zutt, Brashit and Tulin; buying glass for a damaged mosque in Quabrika, etc.37 In 2008, at the 
International Conference for Support to Lebanon, the Minister for Education Affairs Noel Treacy announced 
that the Irish contribution will reach 5 million euros in bilateral humanitarian and recovery assistance in 
the aftermath of the 2006 war that cost Lebanon 1,200 deaths, over one million displaced, and large-scale 
destruction.38 
During the author’s interviews in the Irish Headquarters in UNIFIL, a number of Irish soldiers and offi cers 
referred to humanitarian missions as a core task in Lebanon. One offi cer stated that UNIFIL has been evolving 
since his fi rst deployment in the 1990s. When he was fi rst deployed in the 1990s, UNIFIL was regarded as a 
pure operational mission which supervised peace in the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. Currently, 
the offi cer stated that the fi rst priority is to support local people, the second is to train the Lebanese Armed 
Forces, and the third priority is the operational mission. His statement might be rather exaggerated although 
he implied that the evolution of UN operations means the enhancement of local peace and the more focus on 
humanitarian activities. 
Particularly, at the time of writing when the local situation is relatively calm with little signifi cant political 
confrontation between Israel and Lebanon, the task of humanitarian assistance has been a greater motivation 
for Irish soldiers to participate in UNIFIL. 
However, it is to be noted that some offi cers mentioned that the Irish personnel’s humanitarian activities 
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have had mixed effects. He said “the more contact with local people in operations, the better relation we will get 
with them, but the more risk you will be ambushed by armed elements who pretend to be normal people.”39
Meanwhile, Irish Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Kelly argued that the strengths of the Irish 
troops in Lebanon is “acceptability”,40 which is another characteristics of Irish peacekeeping along with 
“defensiveness” and “humanitarianism”. He argued that the Irish contingents are more acceptable to local 
people in Lebanon because Ireland was not an ex-colonial power, and it had even been colonized by Britain 
for several centuries. Therefore, it can be argued that there would be a degree of sympathy with people in 
the Middle East, such as Lebanese and Palestinians.41 In fact, one Irish offi cer said, “Ireland is sympathetic to 
people suffering from confl icts. It is because of our history of being victimized by the UK.”42 Another said, “We 
are not Americans. We have a spirit of helping each other. We have a history of famine.”43 
4-2.  Individual motivation: for soldiers, junior and senior offi  cers 
Furthermore, the author interviewed with a number of Irish soldiers and offi cers in UNIFIL, asking what 
their motivation to join UNFIL is. For example, one Irish soldier said:
I joined UNIFIL because it is tradition and culture. It is good that a small country like Ireland can contribute 
to world peace. I like to join UNFIL because by doing so I can be in the military mood. So, I joined in 
peacekeeping in Africa and Kosovo. If Ireland had not joined peacekeeping, I would not be in military.44
Thus, many young Irish soldiers want to join UNFIL as a practical site of military activities. Even another young 
Irish soldier answered:
UNIFIL is a chapter-VI mission, so it is peacekeeping. The UN missions in Liberia and Eritrea are totally 
different. They are peace enforcement. Personally, I prefer joining peace enforcement, because it is more close 
to the reality of military.
Thus, the willingness of Irish soldiers to join Chapter VII-led peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping is one 
of the factors which encourage the Irish Government and Defence Forces to adopt the “dual truck” policy to 
UN operations. In fact, the Irish Government has been positively considering of dispatching a small number of 
the Irish Special Forces to MINUSMA, the most fatal UN mission at present.45 Meanwhile, one soldier said that 
one of the good point of doing peacekeeping missions is mobility. He continued:
I have been to many UN peacekeeping operations including UNIFIL(Lebanon), MINURCAT (Chad), and 
UNDOF (the Golan Height). I like UNIFIL, but I like UNDOF best. Because in UNDOF, I can go to many 
places such as Israel.46
As one interviewee put it, the experience gained in the complex, sometimes (often) hostile, peacekeeping 
environment in South Lebanon was invaluable, as an individual soldier/offi cer testing ones own abilities and 
self-belief, but also on an organizational (Defence Forces) level reinforcing benefits of training, equipment, 
organization, logistical support, etc. or highlighting gaps in these areas. It facilitated comparisons with other 
armies from other contributing nations.47
Meanwhile, some Irish junior of ficers emphasized enhancing leadership as their motivations to be 
deployed in UNIFIL. One offi cer said:
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The good thing of the deployment in UNIFIL is exposure. Everyday, we are facing together. However, back in 
Dublin, we are facing once or twice a week. This is important for developing leadership.48
Another Lieutenant offi cer mentioned that it is signifi cant for a junior offi cer like him to have an experience 
as a platoon commander. He said that such experience was possible only when he was deployed to UN 
peacekeeping operations like UNIFIL. Some of them said that they are very satisfi ed with their self-suffi cient 
life as platoon commander with about thirty young subordinate soldiers in UNIFIL.49
Meanwhile, it is to be noted that several senior officers, who have long experience as peacekeepers in 
UNIFIL, value the missions of UNIFIL as humanitarian. One senior offi cer compared UNIFIL with UNTAET in 
East Timor which was Chapter VII-led peace enforcement:
UN mission in East Timor was tense and challenging. So, it gave soldiers good discipline. East Timor Mission 
was more mobile, walking in the jungle, where they might come across militias. So, UNTAET was more 
satisfaction for young soldiers, who like challenges and adventure. Meanwhile, in UNIFIL, we can get to know 
locals because there is peace and situation is benign in Lebanon. We used to donate our blood for locals here. 
We even made a blackboard for children at school. Here we can make 100 from zero for local people.     
One senior offi cer said that the essence of peacekeeping is the protection of local people, not the protection 
of UN personnel. Therefore, he said that the current popular international norms of Responsibility to Protect 
and Human Security should not be something new. The senior officer even mentioned that as the Irish 
peacekeepers are engaged in UNIFIL for a longer time, they tend to feel their humanitarian tasks as their 
individual commitment rather than their offi cial duties in the Irish Defence Forces.50 
On the whole, the motivation of Irish contingents of participating in UNIFIL largely depends on their age 
or rank. Young soldiers tend to pursue their self-interest for participating in UNIFIL. They come to UNIFIL 
for new experience, improving military skill, going somewhere they don’t know, or simply excitement. Many 
of them would not hesitate to be deployed to more risky operations such as peace enforcement. Meanwhile, 
the Irish military personnel such as junior offi cers with the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant are motivated to 
join UNIFIL in order to obtain military leadership in the practical site, namely, UNIFIL. They are generally 
motivated to be promoted to higher senior of ficers’ ranks, and therefore, they are eager to raise their 
professionalism and leadership, such as training and educating their subordinate soldiers in their own platoons. 
Furthermore, the more senior Irish offi cers tend to identify the value of UNIFIL in their humanitarian activities, 
rather than pure operational missions. They focus more on supporting local people. Although senior military 
offi cers are required to prioritize strategic aspects in the mission, they tend to regard the humanitarian aspects 
as their individual commitment.   
5.  Conclusion
This paper dealt with UN peacekeeping operations, especially from the viewpoint of contributing states. 
This paper focused on Ireland, based on the author’s fi eld research in UNIFIL where the Irish Battalion has 
been deployed.
The first part of the paper dealt with the historical analysis of the theory of contributing states’ policy 
towards UN peacekeeping operations. The theory has been evolving. The debate in its early days was simply 
共栄大学研究論集　第 18号（2019）
─ 44─
based on whether dispatching peacekeeping is under the “realists or idealists” perspectives. And the latest 
theory is based on the fi ve rationales, such as political, economic, security, institutional and normative ones. 
The second and the third parts of the paper were based on the author’s fi eld research. The second part 
concerned the current situation in the Irish area of operations. The third part will deal with generall and 
individual motivation of the Irish contingents for UNIFIL. The paper indicated that the situation of the Irish 
area of operations, which is close to the border to Israel, has not been so optimistic. Especially, the Irish area 
of operations includes Hezbollah-based town Bint Jubayl and other consevative villages, which are dubious and 
cautious of UNIFIL. In Bint Jubayl, the economy of the town depends on Hezbollah’s belligerent operations. 
In this sense, peace in UNIFIL areas is not always positive for some locals. Meanwhile, Israel has continued 
conducting provocative action, such as the interference of unmanned aerial vehicles above the Lebanese 
territory. Although Israel recognize a role for a buffer in South Lebanon, it has not been supportive of UNIFIL. 
Furthermore, the five major military operations against Lebanon in the past (in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and 
2006) illustrated Israel’s strong commitment and determination against Lebanon or Hezbollah. It has had 
serious potential of serious casualties of the UN personnel including Irish as well as Lebanese civilians. Since 
UNFIL has been a Chapter VI- led peacekeeping operation, it does not necessarily mean peacekeeping has 
always been safer than Chapter VII-led peace enforcement. 
In terms of Irish motivation for participating in UNIFIL, it has a large degree of institutional and normative 
rationale in accordance with Bellamy and Williams’ theory. The author’s interviews with the Irish contingent in 
August 2019 convinced that all most all of the Irish soldiers and offi cers showed the positive attitude towards 
their commitment to UNIFIL. They recognized both the individual and organizational benefi ts in military by 
participating in UNIFIL. The intrinsic nature of its defensive, humanitarian, and acceptable posture in the 
Irish Defence Forces encourages further strong commitment to UNIFIL. In particular, the Irish contingents’ 
consistent contribution to humanitarian sectors indicates the normative rationale of Irish motivation in UNIFIL 
based on altruism. Meanwhile, it is to be noted that even a small number of Irish officers mentioned the 
dilemma that too much altruism, optimism and humanitarianism might enhance the probability of the Irish 
contingents to be ambushed by armed elements. Furthermore, this paper indicated that the perception of the 
individual benefi ts of Irish contingents depends on their age and rank in the Defence Forces. The young Irish 
military personnel tend to identify the value of participating in UNIFIL in their individual performance. The 
junior Irish officers expect that UNIFIL provide a significant opportunity for them to boost their leadership 
and commanding skills in their platoons. The senior officers tend to identify UNFIL providing a significant 
opportunity of supporting local people as a humanitarian mission. Meanwhile, the author’s interviews with the 
Irish contingents have hardly identifi ed economic and security rationales for the Irish contingents. For example, 
in the interviews, there was no Irish soldier or offi cer who mentioned the benefi ts of fi nancial allowance by 
participating in UNIFIL. Likewise, there was no Irish personnel who perceive the security advantage for Irish 
troops, such as the relation to the so-called Northern Ireland issue, or the regional security issues in Europe. 
The relation between Ireland and UNIFIL illustrates not optimistic local situation for peacekeepers and theory 
of liberal peace from the dispatching side of peacekeeping.
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